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FUGITIVES AND REFUGEES
IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR*

INTRODUCTION

In this study we examine the plight of fugitives and refugees, individuals and groups, who were reduced to their condition during, or as a result of, the Peloponnesian War. Most of them, especially among the groups, became fugitives or refugees after they had played an active role in civil strife in their state, and their party had been defeated. Some of the groups were "Fifth-columnists" in their city during an attack by an external enemy with whom they sympathized politically; this phenomenon was very frequent throughout the Peloponnesian War.¹

There is difficulty in distinguishing between exiles and fugitives or refugees,² since the standard term employed by the authors is "φυγάζει" for all categories. In most cases, of course, one can tell from the context whether an

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¹ This study is based on the third, unpublished, part of my thesis, submitted in 1973 to the University of London for the Ph. D. degree. It has been revised in several places and brought bibliographically up to date.


individual3 or a group4 of citizens were "banished" or "expelled" by the authorities or the rival party, or whether they "escaped" or "fled" or "took refuge in...". In some instances, however, one cannot distinguish this from the context; in this case a closer examination of the development of the story is necessary, and sometimes even this proves to be inadequate in establishing for certain whether it concerns exiles or fugitives.5 This is partly due to Thucydides' usual practice of giving occasional information about the activities of people whom he calls "φυγάδες" without having previously mentioned them.6 Sometimes he even refers to such doubtful "exiles" only once, so that we lack both the beginning and the continuation of a case.7 The same difficulty occurs with the other relevant terms, whether nouns ("φυγάς", "κάθοδος" etc) or verbs ("κατάγειν", "κατιέναι", "φεύγειν" etc). The use of the verb "ἐκπίπτειν" in Thucydides is of special interest: of the twenty two times it appears in the entire History, thirteen times it is used clearly with the passive meaning of "being expelled", three times rather with the active of "escape" or "take refuge", and the meaning of the remaining six instances is irrelevant to exiles or fugitives.8

The subject analysed in this article is that of is the instances of fugitives and refugees which were established for certain, of those people who for various reasons (mainly political) either left their country voluntarily or were forced to condemn themselves into self-exile in order to avoid arrest or trial or the indignation of their countrymen.

Alkibiades' case was by far the most significant of all individual instances in the War. He became a fugitive twice, and in both cases his decision turned out to be fatal for Athens and perhaps for the outcome of the whole War; the second time proved literally fatal for him, too.9

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3. Individual exiles in the Peloponnesian War established as certain: Thuc. II.33.1, 95.2, III.8.1, IV.65.3, V.16.1-3, 26.5, 72.1, VIII.70.2, 73.3, 74.2.85.3 and 92.4-93.1; Xen. Hell. I.1.27, 1.32, 3.13, 5.19, II.3.15; Diod. XIV.12.3; Plut. Nik. 23.4, Paus. VI.7.6.

4. Groups of exiles established as certain: Thuc. II.27.1-2, 68.6, 70.3-4, 72.3, 94.4, 102.1, IV.56.2, 66.1-4, 105.2-106.1, V.1.1, 4.2-4, 5.1, 18.5, 32.1, 82.2, 83.3, 115.1, VI.6.2, 7.1, VII.33.6, 50.1, VIII.21.1, 64.4, 73.6; Xen. Hell. II.2.11, 3.6; Diod. XII.80.3, 82.5, XIII.48.7-8, 65.3, 72.1.

5. Cases where the status of exiles or fugitives during the Peloponnesian War is uncertain,
   (a) individuals: Thuc. IV.76.2, VI.96.3, VIII.6.1; Xen. Hell. II.2.18. (b) groups: Thuc. III.31.1, IV.1.3, 71.1, 73.4, 74.2, VI.7.3, 12.1, 19.1, 64.1, VIII.100.3; Lys. XII.4, 8, 16, 18; M-L, 87. II.16-18; Xen. Hell. II.2.8, 2.20, 2.23; Diod. XIII.72.1, XIV.5.7, 6.1-2, 36.6; Plut. Lys. 8.3, 14.2-3.

6. As in IV.52.2 and 75.1. Cf. Spratt, on IV.52.2.

7. As in IV.76.2, VI.96.3 and VIII.6.1.


9. See below, pp. 263ff.
All groups of fugitives and refugees and some of the individuals were certainly self-condemned into exile directly because of the implications of local civil strifes, and indirectly because of the Peloponnesian War; for all civil strifes during this period were caused by the general conflict between oligarchy and democracy in which Athens and Sparta and/or their allies were actively involved. From this point of view the study of fugitives and refugees constitutes a unity with that of captives and hostages, and adds to the research into the Law of War (*Jus belli, Kriegsrecht*).

A particular category of refugees is that of the inhabitants of entire cities who were forced to leave their country under the terms of a truce or agreement; in other instances we have violent deportations of the inhabitants of entire cities after they had surrendered to or were besieged by enemies. From the legal point of view these categories were both exiles and refugees: exiles, in view of the fact that they were expelled from their homes, and refugees in view of the fact that they took refuge elsewhere.

The reverse seems to be the case with the democrats of Miletos who, according to Plutarch, were deceived by Lysandros at the end of the War, so that they did not flee into exile and were all slaughtered.

Some of the individual fugitives were sentenced to death in absentia, and their properties confiscated. This happened to Alkibiades when he was a fugitive for the first time, and to some of the most eminent of the Four Hundred who fled to the enemies' camp and were subsequently condemned for treason.

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10. Some of the cases of individuals, however, just took place during the War but were not caused by it or its implications, such as Thuc. IV.133.2-3, Diod. XIII.6.7.

11. As were the major civil strifes in Kerkyra and Megara. In only one case recorded by Diodoros (XIII.104.6) there is evidence that Greek fugitives (democrats of Miletos) took refuge with barbarians (the satrap Pharnabazos).


13. As in Thuc. II.70.3, IV.105.2-106.1, V.18.5; Xen. *Hell*. II.3.6; Cf. Thuc. II.72.3 and VIII.31.2. In the case of Thuc. IV.105.2-106.1 together with the inhabitants there were troops of another state who also enjoyed the benefit of the agreements.

14. As in Thuc. II.27.1, IV.54.3, V.1.1; cf. II.99.3, VI.5.3, 6.2, 94.1.

15. A specific case among them is that of the Messenians; see below, Groups of Fugitives and Refugees, case No 10.

16. *Lys.* 8.3; cf. *ibid*. 19.3. This is contrary to Diodoros' (XIII.104.5-6) information.

17. See below, pp. 283f.
A great proportion of the individual fugitives were among the most important personalities in their country, and some of them were even protagonists in the War, such as Demosthenes, Alkibiades, Gylippos and Konon. Of them, Alkibiades on the first occasion, and Demosthenes and Konon were able to come back home later, to regain their reputation, status and prestige, and to render valuable services to their country.

On the other hand, most members of many of the groups of fugitives and refugees were also able to return to their homes after the civil strife at home was over, and their party came into power, or when an amnesty was offered to all citizens; a characteristic example of the latter case is that of Athens when democracy was restored in 403, and the famous amnesty allowed thousands of exiles and fugitives to be repartitioned.

A quite distinct category of fugitives in the Peloponnesian War is that of the deserters, the "οὐτόμολοι". In the text of the Truce between Athens and Sparta in 423 there is a specific clause exclusively referring to deserters: "During the truce neither side is to receive deserters whether free men of slaves". It has been rightly pointed out that the "slaves" refers mainly to helots from Lakonia, and that the "free men" primarily concerns sailors from the Athenian fleet. Grote wrongly thinks that the "free men" refers to Athens' subject-allies as entire communities, and he seems to have had in mind the concept "deserters" with the modern meaning rather than that of "οὐτόμολοι" in the original Greek.

It is characteristic that of all the sixteen clear literary references to deserters during the Peloponnesian War (twelve are in Thucydides alone)

18. It is noteworthy that the greatest Greek historians were exiles as Plutarch points out (De exilio, 605C), for Westlake (Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History, Manchester, 1969, p. 203 with n. 2) banishment was "almost a professional qualification". Cf. T.S. Brown, "Herodotus and His Profession", Am. Hist. Rev. LIX (1954), pp. 841f. n. 2; he forms a list containing Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistos, Timaios and Androton as historians who wrote in exile, and of Herodotus, Theopompos and Polybios who also suffered banishment. 19. Such was e.g. the restoration of exiles at Athens in 403. 20. See below, Groups of Fugitives and Refugees, case No 17. 21. Thuc. IV.118.7 (Transl. Warner). 22. Spratt, ad loc.; see also Thuc. V.14.3, 23.3, 35.7, VIII.26.2, and Xen. Hell. I.2.18; Gomme, H.C.T., on IV.118.7. 23. Gomme, H.C.T., ad loc.; cf. also Thuc. I.121.3 and Xen. Hell. I.6.4. 24. Hist. of Gr. VI, p.597; cf. Gomme, H.C.T., on IV.118.7.
twelve concern slaves, two free men (both sailors), one, that of the truce, both free men and slaves, while one is uncertain. As in other wars in ancient history, the deserrters in some cases in the Peloponnesian War were also used as first hand informers.

As Gomme points out, Thucydides' narrative in some passages suggests that the desertion of helots played a considerable part in Spartan policy making. In fact, it is commonplace that during the entire War the Spartans were afraid of the helots and the Athenians of their allies.

One passage in Thucydides, referring to slave desertion, offers very clear evidence of the extent in which the heavy armed soldiers and the cavalry used servants: the Athenians sadly retreating in Sicily "carried their own provisions themselves while under arms, some because they had no servants, some because they did not trust the servants they had; many of these had deserted in the past, and most of the rest were doing so now".

Lastly, in the civil strife of Kerkyra, during its first phase, both rival parties endeavoured to attract the support of the slaves outside the city. These gave their support to the democratic faction, apparently by deserting their agricultural duties. It is highly questionable, however, whether this desertion can be also considered as treason and not an act of loyalty, given that Kerkyra was a democratic state and that the agricultural slaves there belonged to the state.


29. As those of IV.41.3 and V.14.3.

30. H.C.T., on V.14.3; Gomme, however, ibid., notes that other Thucydidean passages (as that of V.80) would not have led us to this conclusion.


33. The clearest expression of this fear is perhaps that of Thuc. IV.108.1.

34. VII.75.5 (Transl. Warner); the servants are here called 'δικόλουθοι' while in III.17.3 and VI.102.2 are mentioned as 'στηρότετοι', and in IV.16.1 as 'θεράποντες' of the Spartan hoplites; Cf. Steup (Classen-Steup), and Dover, H.C.T., ad loc.

35. Thuc. III.73.

36. That the Kerkyraian slaves of agriculture were public see Gomme, H.C.T., ad loc.
A. INDIVIDUAL FUGITIVES AND REFUGEES

1. Demosthenes.

The general Demosthenes is first mentioned by Thucydidès in Book III. 91.1, which refers to the military operations of the summer of 426. After some notable initial success during his campaighn in the North-West he was defeated by the Aitolians near Aigion. 37 He lost many allies and a hundred and twenty gallant young Athenians out of a total of three hundred engaged in the fight, including his colleague the general Prokles. 38 This defeat brought the expedition to an abrupt end, and the Athenians returned home, but “Demosthenes stayed behind at Naupaktos and in the neighbourhood, being afraid of the Athenians after what had happened”. 39 So Demosthenes was evidently condemned by himself to exile 40 and became a fugitive. He was soon able, however, to return home triumphantly after two new military successes over the Ambrakiots at Akarnania in the following winter of 426/5. From Thucydidès we learn that “incidentally, after the disaster in Aetolia, it was now, with this achievement to his credit, a much safer thing for him to return home”. 41 He was bringing with him three hundred sets of armour as his personal share (one third of the total), of the spoil, while all the rest of the booty was lost on the voyage home. 42

38. Thuc. III.98.4; cf. Westlake, Individuals, pp. 101f.
39. Thuc. III.98.5; cf. 102.3. We agree with Classen (ad loc.) that “man darf bei dieser Furcht des Dem, wohl an den damals vorherrschenden Einfluss des Kleon denken”, but it is questionable whether his fears were justified; cf. Gomme, H.C.T., on III.114.1. Demosthenes’ fear is explained by Swoboda (op. cit., col. 163) as “Furcht, zur Verantwortung gezogen zu verden”, and by M. Treu (op. cit., p. 426): “D. hat sich nicht getraut, nach Athen zurückzukommen, als später seine Amtszeit aufgelaufen war”. Henderson (Great War, p. 149) referring to Demosthenes’ decision not to return home, bitterly notes that “in this, at least, he acted sagaciously”; but he argues rightly (pp. 150f.) that “perhaps, even for the Aetolian expedition, the general merits more consideration from history than he would have received, as he very well knew, from a jury of his indignant countrymen”.
40. Gomme (H.C.T., ad loc.), despite Thudydides’ clear evidence on that, says “almost self condemned”. Steup also seems to be reserved, when (Classen-Steup, on III.98.5) he notes “wie aus dem Exil”). Stahl, however, (ad loc.) is positive: “ut alibi de exulum, ita hic de Demosthenis sua sponte exulantis reeditu in patriam legitur”.
41. III.114.1 (Transl. Warner).
42. Thuc. ibid.
A controversial problem has been that of whether Demosthenes during his voluntary exile in the North–West, was deprived of his generalship. Thucydides himself fails to make this point clear. In the absence of explicit evidence some scholars have argued that he was indeed deposed from office, some that he was not, while others are guarded. What is certain, however, is that Demosthenes was not re-elected general in the spring of the following year 425 as at the beginning of the Pylos campaign he is expressly mentioned by Thucydides as being “without office since his return from Akarnania”.

Demosthenes’ successes during his voluntary exile in Aitolia enabled him not only to restore the military situation after the Aigion defeat, but also to regain his reputation and a safe and happy return home. His greatest achievement, however, was to come next, at Pylos.

2. Gylippos.

Gylippos is mentioned by Thucydides for the last time in Book VIII. 13, which refers to events of the spring of 413; but he says nothing about the story that Gylippos, more than seven years after his return from Sicily, was convicted of misappropriating money, and became a fugitive. This seems to support the hypothesis that Thucydides probably wrote Books VI and VII in the years immediately following the end of the Sicilian expedition, in which case, of course, he cannot have known about Gylippos’ ultimate fate. Xenophon ignores it, too.

The story is reported by two later authors, Diodoros and Plutarch, the latter’s account being fuller. In summary, Gylippos in 405 while serving as a subordinate to Lysandros, was dispatched by him to Sparta to take there

44. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., p. 1059, n. 1), and Steup (Classen-Steup, on III.105.3).
45. Gomme, H.C.T., on III.98.5 and 114.1. Westlake’s suggestion (Individuals, p. 102) that “he may have been reluctant to mention a case where the Athenians were in his view justified in dismissing a general” seems to us to be somewhat arbitrary and sounds too psycho-analytic, if he really hints, as we think he does, at Thucydides’ own dismissal from office and banishment.
46. IV.2.4.
47. Diodoros (XII.60) in his brief and wrongly dated summary of Demosthenes’ North-West campaign does not say anything about his self-exile.
48. See Westlake, Individuals, pp. 15 and 286 with n. 3.
49. XIII.106.8–9.
the booty seized at Aigospotamoi and, with it, fifteen talents of silver. Gylippus stole a considerable amount of the money but the ephors informed against him; to avoid punishment he fled into exile and was condemned to death in absentia.\(^{51}\)

In Plutarch's words: "Lysander..., what remained of the public money, and the gifts and crows which he had himself received,... sends to Lacedaemon by Gylippus, who had commanded formerly in Sicily. But he, it is reported, unsowed the sacks at the bottom, took a considerable amount of silver out of every one of them, and sewed them up again, not knowing there was a writing in every one stating how much there was. And coming into Sparta, what he had thus stolen away he hid under the tiles of his house, and delivered up the sacks to the magistrates, and showed the seals were upon them. But afterwards, on their opening the sacks and counting it, the quantity of the silver differed from what the writing expressed; and the matter causing some perplexity to the magistrates, Gylippus' servant tells them in a riddle, that under the tiles lay many owls; for, as it seems, the greatest part of the money then current bore the Athenian stamp of the owl. Gylippus having committed so foul and base a deed, after such great and distinguished exploits before, removed himself from Lacedaemon".\(^{52}\)

According to a report of Poseidonios, Gylippus commited suicide while he was a fugitive.\(^{53}\) The integrity of his character had already been doubted in Sicily.\(^{54}\) U. Kahrstedt argues that Gylippus enjoyed all civic rights, in spite of his father's banishment\(^{55}\) (see n. 51), but such a conclusion is not unanimously supported by the scholars.\(^{56}\)

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51. It is characteristic that Gylippus' father, too, according to some sources, had fled Sparta at the time of Perikles, accused of bribery; he was also sentenced to death in his absence and spent his life as a fugitive in Thourioi in Italy. Diodoros comments: "And so these men, who in all other affairs were looked upon as individuals of ability, by such conduct brought shame upon the rest of their lives" (XIII.106.10. Transl. Oldfather); cf. Plut. Nik. 19.4.


53. in Athen. VI.234 A; cf. (F. Jacoby) F. Gr. Hist. 87. F. 48.

54. Thuc. VII.81.1 and 86.4; cf. Plut. Nik. 19.4.


3. Alkibiades.

Alkibiades, who officially was never sentenced to exile\(^57\) by the authorities of his country, twice fled as a fugitive: once in 415 and again in 407. His flight on the first occasion was prompted by allegations that he was involved in the Hermai case and in the profanation of the mysteries, and by an Athenian attempt later to depose him from office in Sicily and to bring him back home for a trial. The Hermai affair and the profanation of the mysteries have to be first analytically discussed here from this specific point of view.

The mutilation of the stone busts of the god Hermes at Athens one night in the early summer of 415 is related by Thucydides in Book VI. 27-29, 53. 1-2 and 60-61.\(^58\) The historian explicitly informs us that Alkibiades was suspected of being at the bottom of, or in sympathy with, the mutilation,\(^59\) and that he was also directly implicated in profane performances of the mysteries in private houses at that time.\(^60\) But, not surprisingly, both the extraordinary outrages excited the Athenians who considered the incidents not only as part of a conspiracy against the democratic establishment but also as a bad omen for the expedition to Sicily, which was now ready to set sail.\(^61\) Alkibiades himself suggested that he should be tried at once, before sailing as co-general to Sicily, but his accusers did not dare to proceed yet.\(^62\) Rewards had been offered for information.\(^63\) Arrests began: “After the

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\(^57\) Cf. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, p. 294, n. 6; he was, however, condemned, only in his absence, twice: Thuc. VI.61.7 (to death) and Xen. HELL. II.3.42 (to exile).


\(^60\) VI.28.1. Dover (H.C.T., p. 283, ad med.) notes that a parallel of the profanation of the mysteries from modern English history is provided by George Selwyn’s mockery of the communion service at Oxford in 1745 as described by P. Kerr in George Selwyn and His Times, London, 1909, pp. 37ff.

\(^61\) Thuc. VI.27.3.

\(^62\) Thuc. 29.1-3. The most active among Alkibiades’ enemies were the demagogues Androkles (Andok. I.27, Plut. Alk. 19.1) and Peisandros (Andok. I.27). Thucydides mentions them in VIII.65.2 and VIII.49 respectively, and passim. But according to Plutarch (Alk. 19.3 and 22.4) the official eisangelia was submitted by Thessalos, son of Kimon. Cf. J. de Romilly (Athen. Imper., p. 208, n. 2) on Thucydides’ opinion about Alkibiades’ enemies.

\(^63\) Thuc. VI.27.2.
expedition had set sail, the Athenians had been just as anxious as before to investigate the facts about the mysteries and about the Hermæ. Instead of checking up on the characters of their informers, they had regarded everything they were told as grounds for suspicion, and on the evidence of complete rogues had arrested and imprisoned some of the best citizens, thinking it better to get to the bottom of things in this way rather than to let any accused person, however good his reputation might be, escape interrogation because of the bad character of the informer". 64

The Athenians, irritated and worried, began to think of Peisistratos and his sons’ tyranny at Athens. 65 Thucydides, after a long excursus to relate in detail the story of Harmodios and Aristogeiton, goes on: “With public opinion inflamed as it was, there were already a number of worthy citizens in prison and there was no sign of things getting any easier; in fact, ‘every day showed an increase of savagery and led to more arrests being made’”. 66 At last, one of the prisoners who was believed to be deeply implicated was persuaded by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession. He accordingly, after having been promised impunity by the authorities, came forward with information implicating himself and others in the affair of the Hermæ. The Athenians, glad to get at last at the truth, as they believed, released the informer at once and with him all those whom he had not denounced. 67 The end of the story, as Thucydides puts it, is as follows: “Those against whom he had given evidence were brought to trial and all who were secured were put to death. The death sentence was passed on all who managed to escape and a price was set on their heads”. 68 The historian comments briefly on the fate of those people declaring with what Henderson called “cynical good sense” 69 the following: “No one can say whether the sufferers were justly punished; but the beneficial effect on the city at the time cannot be denied”. 70 These were the events, as described by Thucydides.

This “one of the prisoners” was Andokides himself. 71 In making his

64. Thuc. VI.53.2 (Transl. Warner).
65. Thuc. VI.54–59. Excitement was reanimated when in the spring of 414 Aristophanes produced his Birds with allusions on this affair; see, e.g., II. 1074f. and Schol. on them.
66. VI.60.2 (Transl. Warner).
67. Thuc. VI.60.2–4.
69. Great War, p. 354.
70. VI.60.5 (Transl. Henderson, ibid.). Cf. Schol., ad loc.
71. We learn this from the orator himself: Andok. l. 48ff. He deals with the Hermæ case in Chapters 11ff., and with the profanation of the mysteries in 34ff., separately.
confession the orator produced a list of the names of those twenty two men who were in his opinion guilty of the mutilation of the Hermai. It is noteworthy that Alkibiades' name was not among those of the "Hermokopidai". Alkibiades, nevertheless, was denounced by Andokides together with thirty two others for participation in the profanation of the mysteries, and the Prytaneis received information from a slave named Andromachos. 72 But the Athenians could not separate in their minds the Hermai from the Mysteries and were determined to have Alkibiades tried and executed. 73

It also happened that a small force of Spartans had marched from the Peloponnese as fas as the Isthmos of Corinth just at the time of this agitation. The Spartan move was in pursuit of some scheme with the Boiotians, but now the Athenians suspected that it had happened by arrangement with Alkibiades, and thought that if the demos had not energetically acted on the information received, by arresting those against whom the information had been laid, the city would have been betrayed. 74 They also suspected Alkibiades' Argive friends of a plot to overthrow democracy at Argos; and it was at this point that the Athenians handed over to the Argive demos those three hundred Argives, whom they kept in the islands, to put to death; and the Argive demos killed them all. 75

In Thucydides we saw that some of the arrested Athenians were put to death and others, who managed, like Alkibiades, to escape into exile were sentenced to death in their absence.

From Philochoros 76 as well as from epigraphic sources we gain information about further measures taken against the Hermokopidai: two stelai have survived which record the confiscated property of Athenians found guilty of the impiety. 77 In line 12 of one of the columns stands:

72. See Andok. I. 11f.
73. Thuc. VI.61.4. Alkibiades' enemies tried to link his name with both cases but finally he was formally alleged only of the profanation of the mysteries (Thuc. VI.28.1, 61.1). It has convincingly been suggested that if the Hermai case was intended to create any kind of obstacle to the expedition to Sicily, which is very probable, then, of course, Alkibiades cannot have participated in it, since it was he who inspired the expedition. Cf., Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, p. 178 n. 1. MacDowell, Andokides, p. 192—3. Westlake, Individuals, p. 221. n. 1.
75. Thuc. VI.61.3. Cf. also V.84.1, VI.61.5. Cf. MacDowell, op. cit., p. 284.
76. See (Jacob) F. Gr. Hist. 328, F.134.
(a) Alkibiades as a Fugitive for the First Time.

When the Athenians sent the sacred ship Salaminia to fetch Alkibiades back home, he and his friends who had been accused with him were permitted to sail on his own ship; but they were soon able to elude their escort and to go into hiding at Thourioi, whence later they made their way to the Peloponnese and finally took refuge in Sparta as political refugees. Thus the Athenians sentenced them to death in absentia. 79 According to Plutarch Alkibiades was also subjected to a curse. 80 and epigraphical evidence shows that his property was confiscated. 81 This was the beginning of the end for Athens in the Peloponnesian War; Alkibiades was now to become her evil spirit until her fall. It has been argued that this was Athens’ fatal error, which led her to disaster. 82 As for Thucydides’ own opinion on this, w agree with Westlake that, when the historian wrote Books VI and VII, he had not “as yet come to regret the recall of Alcibiades as an error of judgement fatal to Athenian prospects in Sicily”. 83 But it is most probable that Thucydides already regarded the Athenian decision to be an unfair and impolitic one, since he expressly says that when Alkibiades was accused “he denied the charges made against him on the spot and was prepared to stand his trial before sailing on the expedition... and to be examined as to whether he had done any of the things of which he was accused; he should suffer the penalty, if found guilty, and, if acquitted, should take up his command. He begged them not to listen to attacks made on him in his absence, but, if he was really guilty to put him to death there and then, and he pointed out how unwise it


79. Thuc. VI.61.4–7.

80. Alk. 22.5.

81. See M.-L, 79, pp. 210ff; cf. Plut. Alk. 22.5; also Balogh, Refugees, pp. 21 and 96 (n. 62); P. Usteri, Aechtung und Verbanlung im griechischen Recht. Diss. Zürich, 1903, p. 43. That condemnation, to death in absentia carried with it also property confiscation see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., p. 1511, n. 2.

82. among others by J.H. Finley, Thucydides, p. 225, who notes: “Thus, at one stroke, Athens not only gave the enemy a brilliant adviser but herself lost her one really gifted leader of the period”.

83. Individuals, p. 222 and n. 1.
would be to send him out in command of such a large army with such serious accusations still hanging over his head.”

This, of course, does not save Alkibiades from the charge of treacherous action against his own country and collaboration with the enemy during his exile.

His speech at Sparta; his advice to the ephors that Sparta should help the Syracusans and also send a general there, and that a permanent post at Dekeleia, in Attica itself, should be occupied by the Peloponnesians; that his mission to Ionia in 412 caused many cities to revolt from Athens; that he later lost the Spartan confidence and fled to the satrap Tissaphernes; that he endeavoured to secure reinstatement at Athens by gaining Persian support and by encouraging the oligarchic revolution in Athens; that the Athenian fleet at Samos appointed him general and for several years (411–407) he displayed outstanding military gifts and even won a brilliant victory at Kyzikos are all recorded in detail, mainly by Thucydides and Xenophon, as well as by later authors including Diodorus, Plutarch and Nepos and are commented on and investigated by numerous modern scholars such as Grote, Busolt, Steup, Henderson, J.H. Finley, Hatzfeld, Delebecque, Brunt, Romilly, Andrewes, Dover, Westlake, von Fritz, Bloedow, and others.

**TABLE I**

Thucydides expressly refers to Alkibiades as a fugitive in the following places:

1. **VI.74.1** «ἐπιστάμενος δι’ ἑαυτοῦ»
2. **VI.92.2** «τὴν φυγαδικὴν προθυμίαν»
3. **VI.92.3** «φυγάς... εἰμί»
4. **VIII.47.1** «τὴν κάθεδρον», «πείσαντι κατέλθειν»
5. **VIII.47.2** «κατελθὼν»
6. **VIII.48.2** «'Αλκιβιάδος τε κατελθόντος»
7. **VIII.48.4** «παρακληθείς κάτεισι»
8. **VIII.53.1** «‘Αλκιβιάδην καταγαγοῦσι»

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84. VI.29.1 (Transl. Warner); cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.14. Also Aristophanes (who “throughout all his many plays... shows a curious reserve when Alcibiades is his theme” –Henderson, *Great War*, p. 417), in the *Frogs* 1431ff. alludes to Athens’ wrong tactic towards Alcibiades.


87. See Table I.

88. See Table II. On *Hell.* 1.4.10 Andrewes (“The Generals”, p. 3) argues that the information cannot be correct (Table II, 2).

89. *opp. cit.* in the bibliography below.
9. VIII.53.2 «εἴ κάτεισι», «μὴ κατάγειν»
10. VIII.65.2 «τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ὡς κατιόντι»
11. VIII.68.3 «ὑπ’ ὀλγαρχίας κατελθεῖν»
12. VIII.70.1 «τοὺς φεύγοντας οὖ κατηγὸν τοῦ Ἀ. ἔνεκα»
13. VIII.76.7 «ἡν αὐτῶ ἀδειόν τε καὶ κάθοδον ποιήσωσιν»
14. VIII.81.2 «τῆς φυγῆς»
15. VIII.83.1 «τὴν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον»
16. VIII.87.1 «διὰ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον»
17. VIII.97.3 «ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην κατιέναι»

**TABLE II**

Xenophon expressly refers to Alkibiades as a fugitive for the first time in the following places: *(Hell.)*

1. I.4.8 «’Α. βουλόμενος ἀποπλεῖν οἰκαδε»
2. I.4.10 «’Α. μὲν φεύγοντα»
3. I.4.13 «οὖ δικαίως φύγοι»
4. I.4.14 «ἀπόντα αὐτῶν ἐστερησαν τῆς πατρίδος»
5. I.4.15 «φυγή ἄπειρογένος»
6. I.4.21 «μετὰ τὸν κατάπλουν»

Let us now see how Alkibiades returned home from his first exile, about eight years after he deserted to Sparta. 90 Xenophon, as Henry 91 convincingly suggests, with the first two Books of the *Hellenica* was consciously intending to compose the formal continuation of Thucydides’ *History.* 92 So Xenophon, referring to Alkibiades’ return, seizes the opportunity to make an evaluation of this most controversial figure, which agrees with that made by Thucydides-

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des. In both historians' opinion Alkibiades' downfall and exile was embossed by jealous rival politicians who wanted to destroy him and gain the people's favour. Xenophon says: "He had been the victim of plots, hatched in the brains of people less able than himself, however much they might excel in pestilent speech; men whose one principle of statecraft was to look to their private gains; whereas this man's policy had ever been to uphold the common weal, as much by his private means as by the power of the State. His own choice, eight years ago, when the charge of impiety in the matter of the mysteries was still fresh, would have been to submit to trial once. It was his personal foes, who had succeeded in postponing that undeniably just procedure; who waited till his back was turned and then robbed him of his fatherland. Then it was that, being made the very slave of circumstances, he was driven to court the men he hated most; and at a time when his own life was in daily peril, he must see his dearest friends and fellow citizens, nay, the very State itself, bent on a suicidal course, and yet, in the exclusion of exile, be unable to lend a helping hand". This, though most probably reflecting also Xenophon's own opinion, is reported to be "some people's opinion", while that of others was contrary: "For all their past miseries and misfortunes Alcibiades alone was responsible: 'If more trials were still in store for the State, here was the master mischief—maker ready at his post to precipitate them'". But, judging from the multitude and the enthusiasm with which Alkibiades was welcomed home, obviously the former opinion was the predominant among the crowds: "As he sailed into the harbour, two great crowds — one from Piraeus, the other from the city — flocked to meet the vessels. Wonderment, mixed with a desire to see Alcibiades, was the prevailing sentiment of the multitude". According to Xenophon (Hell. I.4.12) and Plutarch (Alk. 34.1 from Xenophon), it was the very day of the festival of Plynteria, and this was considered as a coincidence

93. VI.28.2. Ephoros' evaluation of Alkibiades (as recorded in Diod. XIII 68.4) is also very similar.

94. Hell. I.4.13-15 (Transl. Dakyns). The similarity of this passage with Thucydides' VI.28 is, in fact, striking. The only real difference is that, while Thucydides expresses his personal opinion, Xenophon is representing the above evaluation as that voiced by some of the bystanders at the reception of Alkibiades in Athens. Cf. Henry, Hellenica, p. 47.

95. Hell. I.4.17 (Transl Dakyns).

of evil omen for both the state and Alkibiades, for “no Athenian should transact serious business on such a day”.

When the ships came to their moorings, Alkibiades through fear of his enemies did not disembark immediately; mounting on the quarterdeck he looked first to see if his friends were there among the crowds. Finally, when he discerned his relations and friends, he landed and so, in the midst of an enthusiastic escort ready to put down any attempt upon him, made his way to the city.

In the speeches Alkibiades delivered in the Boule and the Ekklesia he defended himself against the allegations of impiety, and asserted that he had been the victim of injustice; in that atmosphere no one in the Assembly ventured to gainsay his words. Then he was formally declared hegemon autokrator, a kind of leader of the State with irresponsible powers, as being “capable of restoring the previous strength and prestige of Athens”. His first act was to institute anew the processional march to Eleusis, for of late years the Athenians had been forced to conduct the mysteries by sea. His next step was to muster a force of fifteen hundred heavy infantry, one hundred and fifty cavalry, and one hundred ships. Lastly, three months after his return from exile, he set sail for Andros which had revolted from Athens. New military successes came to strengthen Alkibiades’ position in the supreme leadership of Athens; but later in the same year 407 he could effect little against the powerful combination of Lysandros and Kyros, until

97. Xen. ibid. Ephoros, however, as recorded by Diodoros (XIII.68) in Nepos (Alc. 6) and in Just. (Epit. V.4), does not mention that.

98. Xen. Hell. 1.4.18–9. It is worth noting here that one of those who shared Alkibiades’ rehabilitation was Adeimantos, his friend and fellow demesman; he had been denounced as one of the Hermokopidae by Agariste and been sent into exile (Andok. I.16); after his return in 407 with Alk. he became a general (Xen. Hell. 1.4.21), but was not affected by Alkibiades’ second fall; he was among the generals at Aigospotamoi, and was later accused of treachery there (Xen. Hell. 1.7.1, 11.1.30, 32. Lys. XIV.38; cf. Kirchner, P.A., 202, and M-L, pp. 245f. Another man who probably came back home with Alkibiades was his uncle, Aiochous; cf. Westlake, op. cit., p. 232, n. 1.


100. Xen. ibid.

101. Xen. Hell. 1.4.21; cf. Diod. (from Ephoros) XIII.69.4. For another step, probably taken by Alkibiades in 407, see the attractive suggestion of Merit (in Class. Stud. Presented to Edward Capps, p. 249) which was guardedly accepted by M-L, p. 279.
in his absence part of his fleet under the command of his subordinate Antiochus suffered a defeat at Notion. When Alkibiades, on hearing the news, rushed back, he found Lysandros safe at Ephesos; the Athenians offered battle, the Spartan refused it. 102 But, although the defeat had not deprived Alkibiades of his admitted superiority at sea, this was the beginning of the second and final downfall of Alkibiades who was thus to become a fugitive for the second time.

(b) Alkibiades as a Fugitive for the Second Time.

The Athenian defeat at the battle of Notion was not so important per se for its military consequences as for its political effect; indeed, the Athenians committed now their second and final mistake towards Alkibiades: they dismissed him from his command, and he fled into exile within the same year of his return. In Xenophon’s account it reads: “But now the news of the late disaster at Notium had reached the Athenians at home, and in their indignation they turned upon Alcibiades, to whose negligence and lack of self-command they attributed the destruction of the ships. Accordingly they chose ten new generals.”

Alkibiades did not return home. 104 From Samos he went quietly off to Thrace and became a fugitive again. “Alkibiades”, says Xenophon, “who was moreover in bad odour in the camp, sailed away with a single trireme to his private fortress in the Chersonese”. 105 This time he was formally dismissed from his command by the Athenians but was not condemned into exile, or death in absentia nor deprived of his property. 106 Diodoros provides a specific reason for Alkibiades’ flight: he was afraid lest the Athenians, seizing a suitable occasion, would inflict upon him a punishment for all the injustices he had committed against them; consequently he condemned himself to exile. 107 Upon this Grote takes the opportunity to attack

104. Or, in Henderson’s words (Great War, p. 448), “Knew better than to go back home”.
105. Hell. I.5.17 (Transl. Dakyns); cf. Plut. Lys. 5.3, Alk. 36.5. Diodoros (XIII.74.2) and Nepos (Alc. 7) both from Ephoros, say Alkibiades withdrew to “Paktye in Thrace”.
106. Lys. XIX.52; Isokr. XVI.46.
107. XIII.74.4 (from Ephoros, who follows Lysias XIV.38, almost e verbo).
Alkibiades as a man who "had a character worse than none". But the following words seem to us to be nearer the truth: "Feared and distrusted in Athens, Sparta, and Persia alike, the most brilliant man of action of his generation, whose judgement of public policies was as unerring as his personal aims, methods, and conduct were wrong found outlet for his restless energy only in waging private war on the 'kingless' Thracians. Had Athens been able to trust him he might have saved her Empire and destroyed her liberty." Aristophanes in the Frogs, produced in 405, when Alkibiades was still alive and in self-exile, surely reflects much of the public opinion about Alkibiades at that time:

DIONYSUS Now then, whichever of you two shall best Advise 
Advise the city, he shall come with me. 
And first of Alcibiades, let each 
Say what he thinks; the city travails sore.

EURIPIDES What does she think herself about him?

DION. She loves and hates and longs to have him back. 
But give me your advice about the man.

EUR. I loathe a townsman who is slow to aid. 
And swift to hurt his town; who ways and means. 
Finds for himself, but finds not for the State.

DION. Poseidon, but that's smart! (To Aeschylus) 
And what say you?

AESCHYLUS 'Twere best to rear no lion in the State: 
But having reared, 'tis best to humour him'.

Henderson attacking Grote for his criticism against Alkibiades maintains that he deserved neither judicial animadversion nor dismissal. But

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108. Hist. of Gr., VIII, pp. 211-6, esp. 212.
110. 1020-1032 (Transl. Rogers), The allusion of Aischylus' answer (1031-2) is clear: "ού χρή λέοντος σκύμνον έν πόλει τρέφειν / ήν δ' ἐκτραφή τις, τοῖς τρόποις ύπηρετέιν'. Cf. Plut. 
Apophth. Lak., 41:

"— Δάκνεις, ὁσπερ αἱ γυναίκες. 
— Οὗ μὲν οὖν, ἄλλ᾽ ὁσπερ οἱ λέοντες".

Cf. also Lys. XIV.16: "εἰ ('Αλκιβιάδην) τηλικοῦτον δύνα ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτε πρώτον εἰς ὑμᾶς κλάβητε ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, οὐκ ἂν ἐγένοντο συμφοραί τοσοῦτοι τῇ πόλει".

111. Great War, p. 449. Henderson, concluding his judgement of Alkibiades, adds: "When the whole tragedy of Alkibiades and his city is ended and the curtain falls, which of the two has the greater need for forgiveness at the judgement seat of history?"
Beloch seems to us to be more justified in pointing out: "Eine Nieberlage, an der Alkibiades zwar direkt ohne Schuld war, für die er aber als Oberbefehlshaber doch, und mit Recht, die Verantwortung tragen musste".112

In the place of his exile Alkibiades gathered troops and lived as an autonomous local leader, fighting against some neighbouring Thracian tribes and making friends with others.113 But the only noteworthy instant of his life, as a fugitive for the second time, is his attitude towards the troops of his country in 405, a few hours before the disastrous (for Athens) battle at Aigospotamoi began: he tried, indeed, to save the fleet and his country from the final blow; but in vain.

Knowing well from personal experience Lysandros' craft and enterprise, Alkibiades came down alone on horseback from his castle in the Chersonese to the Athenian army to counsel the generals: "But now Alkibiades", says Xenophôn, "from one of his fortresses, could espy the position of his fellow-countrymen, moored on an open beach beyond reach of any city, and forced to send for supplies to Sestos, which was nearly two miles distant, while their enemies were safely lodged in a harbour, with a city adjoining, and everything within reach. The situation did not please him, and he advised them to shift their anchorage to Sestos, where they could have the advantage of a harbour and a city. 'Once there', he concluded, 'you can engage the enemy whenever it suits you'".114 Diodoros (from Ephoros) says that Alkibiades added to the generals that he, too, could help by raising in their support natives of the countryside, some Thracian tribes whose chiefs were his own friends; that these chiefs had agreed to give him a large army, if he wanted to make war to a finish on the Spartans; that for this reason he asked the generals to give him a share in the command, promising them either to compel Lysandros to accept battle or to contend with them on land with the help of the Thracians115. Diodoros provides also explanation of Alkibiades' offer: "from a desire to achieve by his own efforts some great success for his country and through his benefactions to bring the people back to their old affection for him";116 which implies that his final purpose was, again, to be recalled from his self-exile and to restore his own leadership in Athens. This

113. Plut. Alk. 36, 37; Nep. Alc. 7.4; cf. Diod. XIII.105.3.
114. Hell. II.1.25 (Transl. Dakyns).
115. XIII.105.3.
information, however, is not beyond question. Busolt finds it "eine... höchst unwahrscheinliche und offenbar willkürlich erfundene Darstellung".\textsuperscript{117}

The reaction of the Athenian commanders was tough: "the generals, and more particularly Tydæus and Menander, bade him go about his business. 'We are generals now — not you', they said; and so he went away".\textsuperscript{118} Plutarch adds that Alkibiades even suspected there must be treachery among the generals.\textsuperscript{119} Diodoros, on the other hand, continuing Ephoros' version, gives also a reason for this reaction of the generals to Alkibiades' offer: they considered that in case of defeat the blame would attach to them and in case of success all men would attribute it to Alkibiades.\textsuperscript{120}

After the fall of Athens in 404, Alkibiades was among those on whom the Thirty pronounced a decree of exile.\textsuperscript{121} To him and all others put under the ban there was to be no asylum anywhere; and, of course, Sparta was found willing to collaborate in this respect with the oligarchic regime of Athens which Lysandros had established. So Sparta issued an order prohibiting, under the threat of heavy fines, sanctuary in states of the Peloponnesian alliance to exiles or fugitives from the oppression of the Thirty at Athens.\textsuperscript{122} Fearing this, Alkibiades fled from his stronghold in the Chersonese and sought the nominal protection of the Persian Satrap Pharnabazos in Phrygia. But, as Kritias, one of the chief leaders of the Thirty, "taught" Lysandros, if Alkibiades was to live, the Athenian oligarchy would be in danger and if Athens was to be democratic again, the Spartans would not dominate all Greece with any degree of security; so Alkibiades had to die.\textsuperscript{123} A secret message was sent by the ephors to Lysandros and by him to Pharnabazos with the request that the Athenian guest should be killed. The Persian did not refuse to arrange this affair. One winter night of 404 Alkibiades awoke to find his bedroom in flames; he rushed out with drawn sword to meet the assassins, but a rain of darts fell upon him. He was only forty-five years of age.\textsuperscript{124} Plutarch relates that the Athenians, after

\textsuperscript{117} Gr. Gesch., pp. 1619f., n. 4.

\textsuperscript{118} Xen. Hell. II.1.26 (Transl. Dakyns).

\textsuperscript{119} Alk. 37.2 and Lys. 11.1.

\textsuperscript{120} XIII.105.4.


\textsuperscript{122} Lys. XII.95, 97. Plut. Lys. 27.5 and Pel. 6.5. Cf. also Just. (Epit.) V.9.4, Diod. XIV.6.3.

\textsuperscript{123} Plut. Alk. 38.5f.

\textsuperscript{124} Plut. Alk. 39. Plutarch (ibid.) gives another version of Alkibiades' death, and Diodoros (XIV.11, from Ephoros) a third one. Cf. Isokr. XVI.40. Four authors, probably all from Ephoros, Diodoros (ibid.), Nepos (Alc. 10.4), Plutarch (ibid.) and Athenaeos (XIII.574e) agree
having dismissed Alkibiades from his command, acknowledged too late their blindness and errors, and looked upon their second measure against Alkibiades as the greatest of their errors: “In wrath against a subordinate for losing a few ships disgracefully, still more disgracefully they themselves had robbed the city of their greatest and most war-like general”.

4. Konon.

In the crippling Athenian defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405, together with thousands of sailors, the Athenian generals Philokles and Adeimantos were taken prisoner, and apparently all the other generals except Konon. Xenophon relates that Konon with eight vessels escaped: “Knowing that the fortune of Athens was ruined, he put into Abarnis, the promontory of Lampsacus, and there picked up the great sails of Lysander’s ships and then with eight ships set sail himself to seek refuge with Euagoras in Cyprus, while the Paralus started for Athens with tidings of what had taken place”. Xenophon’s explanation of why Konon did not sail back home but became a refugee shows that the general was well aware that to return to Athens, after the destruction of the whole fleet, was to become certainly one more prisoner of Lysandros in the City; but in Diodoros’ view (from Ephoros) the reason was the fear of facing the indignation of his countrymen; he adds that Euagoras was at that time in control of Cyprus and that Konon had friendly relations with him. But whatever the exact motives behind this resolution, it is certain that by becoming a fugitive Konon was able to offer great services to his country later; eleven years after he fled Athens, in 394, he managed totally to destroy the Spartan fleet at Knidos and one year afterwards to return to Athens triumphantly and to build up her walls again. Three years before, in 397, Konon on his request had been asked to construct a great fleet for the Persian King whose service he had joined; it was with this fleet that he annihilated the Spartan sea power; and it was this revenge for the Aigospotamoi disaster which Konon had in mind when he

that the assassination took place in a small town in Phrygia. It is strange that Xenophon does not mention it.


126. Hell. II.1.29 (Transl. Dakyns); cf. Lys. XXI.9–11, and Plut. Lys. 11 and Alk. 37.

127. XIII.106.6; cf. Paus. III.11.5.

started negotiations with the Persian King for the construction of a fleet and for the revival of the Persian navy. Euagoras himself must have played some positive role in this affair, and certainly he helped to a great extent with the construction of the fleet.

5. Ptoiodoros.

We learn from Thucydides that in the summer of 424, shortly before the campaign of Delion, there had been some “fifth columnists” in the cities of Boiotia, who had been intriguing with the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippokrates with a view to changing the constitution and introducing a democracy, as at Athens; that it was Ptoiodoros a Theban who had taken the chief part in these negotiations; and that, among other groups, the exiled party from Orchomenos were particularly active in the plot and hired troops from the Peloponnese.

Nothing more is known about this Ptoiodoros; we cannot even know for sure whether he was an exile or a fugitive, as Thucydides uses for him the term “φυγας” which gives no clear indication, since it can be used for both exiles and fugitives.

We certainly know, however, that after their defeat at Delion, in the winter of the same year 424/3, the Athenians honoured those Boiotians who were now in exile at Athens; Ptoiodoros was probably amongst them, if he survived the unsuccessful attempt. He is not mentioned further by Thucydides or by any other source.

132. Isokr. IX.56. 67. 68. From Isokrates (IX.51ff.) and Lysias (XIX.23. 36. 44) we also learn that at Salamis in Cyprus a colony of Greek, especially Athenian, fugitives had been founded.
134. IV.76.2–3. As for the Orchomenian exiles here, as Gomme (H.C.T., ad loc.) points out, they are in contrast to Thuc. I.113.2, and Orchomenos had often been at enmity with Thebes; “but class solidarity is now stronger than local patriotism” (ibid., on I.111.3), probably meaning “party solidarity”.
135. Cf. Spratt, ad loc.
136. IG. I’, 68–69, 70 (Cf. 103); S.E.G. X.81. 84; Cf. Gomme (H.C.T., on IV.101.2).
137. In R.E., s.v., Ptoiodoros, 2. K. Ziegler, using apparently an argumentum ex silentio, thinks that Ptoiodoros “dürfte den Misserfolg nicht überlebt haben”. But there is no evidence whatsoever.
6. The Priestess Chrysis.

In the summer of 423 the Heraion at Argos was burnt down. Chrysis, who had been priestess of the temple for fifty six and a half years,\textsuperscript{138} being responsible for the fire, at once took refuge in Phleious and later in Tegea,\textsuperscript{139} for fear of the Argives. She provides one of the few instances of those who sought refuge in flight during the War but not as a result of the War. In Thucydides’ words: “in the same summer the temple of Hera at Argos was burnt down through the negligence of the priestess Chrysis, who put a lighted torch near the garlands and then fell asleep, with the result that they all caught fire and blazed up before she was aware of it. Chrysis herself immediately fled by night to Phlius out of fear of the Argives. They, according to the regular procedure, appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. At the time of her flight Chrysis had been priestess for eight years of this war and half the ninth”.\textsuperscript{140}

Hellanikos in a work called Priestesses of Hera made a chronological table;\textsuperscript{141} the work was published at an unknown date,\textsuperscript{142} but it is presumed that it was already published when Thucydides wrote his first reference to Chrysis.\textsuperscript{143} Dover suggests that Thucydides’ first mention of Chrysis was due to interest in Hellanikos’ recently published work; also that Hellanikos may have finished this work before the temple of Hera was burnt down, an event which is for this reason mentioned by Thucydides at this juncture.\textsuperscript{144}

It is not from Thucydides but from Pausanias that we learn that Chrysis finally became a fugitive in Tegea. Gomme suggests that she did not follow the shortest route through Argos, but went by way of Phleious which Thucydides gives as the only place of her refuge. From Phleious, says Gomme, she would go to Stymphalos and thence to Arkadian Orchomenos. The shrine of Athena Alea at Tegea was of particular sanctity; eminent

\textsuperscript{138} Thuc. II.2.1: forty-eight years at the outbreak of the War plus (IV.133.2-3) eight and a half in 423.

\textsuperscript{139} Paus. III.5.6. On the connection between supplication and sanctuary see E. Schlesinger, Die griechische Asylie (Diss. Giessen), 1933, pp. 28ff.


\textsuperscript{141} (Jacoby) F. Gr. Hist., 4. FF. 74ff.

\textsuperscript{142} Cf. Gomme (H.C.T., vol. I, p. 6, n. 3).


\textsuperscript{144} Matia VI (1953), pp. 8-9; cf. Gomme’s (H.C.T., on IV.133.2-3) reservation towards Dover’s suggestion.
persons took refuge there, and no state would ask for extradition.\textsuperscript{145} Finally, we also learn from Pausanias that, in spite of Chrysis’ neglect, her statue was not removed from the Heraion.\textsuperscript{146} If this information is true, it might mean that, had she not fled, the Argives would have been gentle to her, as she was a priestess\textsuperscript{147} and besides, by that time, a very old lady.

7. Diagoras “the Atheist”.

In Diodoros (from Ephoros) we learn that at Athens in 415 “Diagoras, who was dubbed ‘the atheist’, was accused of impiety and, fearing the people, fled from Attica; and the Athenians announced a reward of a talent of silver to the man who should slay Diagoras.\textsuperscript{148} This is another rare example of one who became fugitive during the War, but not because of it.

Diagoras is said to have originated from Melos and to have been a dithyrambic poet\textsuperscript{149} and author of a lost atheistic writing. He was notorious for his proverbially blasphemous remarks about Athenian divinities.\textsuperscript{150} E. Wellmann, in doubting the correctness of the year of Diagoras’ condemnation, 415, given by Diodoros, employs a reasoning which in our opinion is wrong: “Die Verurteilung des D. in Athen setzt Diodor XIII. 6 in das J. 415; dazu will aber die Anspielung des Aristophanes in den Wolken schlecht stimmen”.\textsuperscript{151} But Aristophanes in this comedy,\textsuperscript{152} produced in 423, does not refer to Diagoras’ actual condemnation but simply to his impiety, which must have been in evidence before the condemnation;\textsuperscript{153} on the contrary, indeed, Aristophanes’ express reference to the Athenian announcement of the reward for the fugitive Diagoras’ head in the Birds, produced in 414, supports the accuracy of the chronology of this incident provided by Ephoros — Diodoros. Besides, 415 coincides with the elevation of religious feeling, at Athens as a result of the Hermai case and the profanation of the mysteries.\textsuperscript{154} There is no further explicit reference to Diagoras’ fate.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{145} H.C.T., on IV.133.2-3.
\textsuperscript{146} II.17.7.
\textsuperscript{147} On the inviolability of priests see Phillipson, Intern. Law, II, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{148} XIII.6.7 (Transl. Oldfather).
\textsuperscript{149} D.L. Page, P.M.G., 738-9 (pp. 382f.).
\textsuperscript{151} in R.E., s.v. “Diagoras”.
\textsuperscript{152} Clouds, 830.
\textsuperscript{154} See the fine remarks of Ferguson in C.A.H., V, pp. 279f.
B. GROUPS OF FUGITIVES AND REFUGEES

1. Refugees of Notion.

From Thucydides we learn that in the summer of 427 the Athenian admiral Paches landed at Notion, the port of Kolophon; some Kolophonians had settled there as part of the town had been taken by the Persian Itamenes with his troops after an invitation by a local faction.\(^{156}\) Those refugees at Notion split up again in two parties, one of which called upon mercenary troops from the Lydian satrap Pissuthnes for help and, with the aid of the pro-Persian faction among the Kolophonians, formed a new community in Notion, while the other party had become fugitives and invited Paches to help them against their opponents. That is why Paches came here.\(^{157}\) The continuation of this story is known.\(^{158}\) One of those fugitives who invited Paches must have been a Kolophonian named Apollophanes; his good services for Athens were recognized by an honorary decree of the Assembly.\(^{159}\)

2. Kerkyraian Fugitives.

When the oligarchs, during the great civil strife at Kerkyra in 417, killed Peithias, the leader of the Kerkyraian democratic party, some of his followers, a few only, escaped and took refuge on the Athenian trireme, which was in the harbour.\(^{160}\)

The Athenian ship with the Kerkyraian fugitives on board must have sailed off soon for Athens since we are informed shortly afterwards that immediately after the coup d' état the new oligarchic regime “sent delegates to Athens to give their own version of what had been done and to try to dissuade the Corcyraean refugees in Athens from taking any action against them which might lead to a counter-revolution”.\(^{161}\) But as soon as these representatives arrived at Athens, the Athenians arrested them and all those

\(^{156}\) III.34.1.
\(^{157}\) Thuc. III.34.1-2.
\(^{158}\) See our Captives and Hostages, pp. 52ff.
\(^{159}\) I.G. I.59. Cf. S.E.G. X.70.
\(^{160}\) Thuc. III.70.6.
\(^{161}\) Thuc. III.71.2 (Transl. Warner); cf. Gomme, H.C.T., ad loc.
among the fugitives who listened to them on a charge of sedition, and put them in custody in Aigina.\textsuperscript{162} The consequent fate of both these oligarchic delegates and the refugees is unknown; but for the latter we can presume that they must have returned to Kerkyra shortly afterwards, when the democratic party gained the upper hand.\textsuperscript{163}

From the same civil war at Kerkyra there is evidence of a few oligarchic fugitives, too. Thucydides relates that when the democrats began to take the upper hand at Kerkyra, Nikostratos, the commander of the Athenian squadron there, intended to arrange a settlement between the two factions: "he persuaded the two parties to agree among themselves to bring to trial ten men who had been chiefly responsible and who had not stayed for the outcome of the negotiations, and were already clear".\textsuperscript{164} Who these ten men were, is not specified; it seems that they were some of the chief leaders of the two parties, and that both parties named for trial men who had already escaped.\textsuperscript{165} Nothing more is known about these "fugitives" and their fate.

After the first massacre of the oligarchs by the rival party in the summer of 427, about five hundred of them who survived, fled into exile and became fugitives.\textsuperscript{166} This is Thucydides' information, according to which these oligarchs were clearly fugitives; and now we read here that the democratic party drove any opponents from the State: they just survived the slaughter and fled as fugitives to the mainland opposite.

Diodoros (from Ephoros), however, says that the democrats absolved the suppliant oligarchs from the punishment of death and expelled them from the city; which means that he refers to exiles, not fugitives.\textsuperscript{167} But Ephoros' partiality here towards the democrats and his intentional falsification of Thucydides' version of the entire Kerkyraian Affair has been strongly criticized.\textsuperscript{168}

This remnant of the oligarchs, according to Thucydides, fled to the mainland opposite and began to harry their democratic enemies; later they

\textsuperscript{162} Thuc. III.71.2-72.1.

\textsuperscript{163} Thuc. III.74.1ff. As for the oligarchic delegates, had the Athenians handed them over to the victorious Kerkyraian demos (Thuc. III.81ff. and IV 46-48), they must have had the same tragic end as the other oligarchs.

\textsuperscript{164} III.75.1.

\textsuperscript{165} Cf. Classen-Steup, \textit{ad loc.}: "man bezeichnete, um Blutvergiessen zu vermeiden, von beiden Seiten nur solche Personen, die sich schon in Sicherheit gebracht hatten". Gomme, \textit{H.C.T.}, \textit{ad loc.}, finds this, "a most humane compromise".

\textsuperscript{166} Thuc. III.85.2.

\textsuperscript{167} XII.57.4.

\textsuperscript{168} See, e.g., Busolt, \textit{Gr. Gesch.}, p. 1051, n. 2 and Gomme, \textit{H.C.T.}, on III 70.1, \textit{ad fin.}
crossed over and seized Mount Istone, in the South of the city of Kerkyra, whence they continued their depredations until in 425 the democrats, with the aid of an Athenian squadron, stormed the fortress on the mountain and forced the fugitives to surrender on the promise of a trial in Athens.¹⁶⁹ Their tragic fate has been examined elsewhere.¹⁷⁰

3. Mytilenean Fugitives.

From Thucydides we learn that in 424 "the exiled party from Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, setting out, most of them, from the mainland, and supported by mercenaries hired from the Peloponnese and others engaged locally, captured Phoeteum".¹⁷¹ After that they succeeded in taking Antandros.¹⁷² There is no clear evidence who these exiles were, for Thucydides who often refers to exiles or fugitives without giving details, did not mention any Mytileneans who were banished or who had fled into exile before. We can safely presume, however, that these were the oligarchs who three years before, in 427, had survived the suppression of the Lesbian revolt and, apparently, became fugitives.¹⁷³ The expression "setting out... from the mainland", with the partitive apposition "most of them", reflects a usual tactic of oligarchic exiles of other islands as well, who used the mainland opposite as a base for operations.¹⁷⁴

We hear of these fugitives again late in 426. Thucydides says that in the summer of the same year, 424, the Mytilenean fugitives were going to carry out a plan of fortifying Antandros but were prevented from achieving their purpose by the commanders of the Athenian ships who had been sent out to collect tributes. The Athenians, fearing that the fortification might become a danger for Mytilene, defeated in battle those who came out from Antandros to oppose them and retook the place.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁹. III.85.2-3 and IV.46.1-2.
¹⁷⁰. See our Captives and Hostages, pp. 60ff.
¹⁷¹. IV.52.2-3 (Transl. Warner).
¹⁷². Thuc. IV.52.3; on the South coast of the Troad in Asia Minor, about fifteen miles from Lesbos.
¹⁷⁴. As in Thuc. III.85.2 and IV.75.1; cf. Gomme, H.C.T., on IV.52.2.
¹⁷⁵. IV.75.1. Thucydides specifies that the Athenians were afraid that a fortified Antandros might become "just as much a danger as Anaia was to Samos" (ibid.). This refers to the Samian fugitives of 439 (Thuc. I.115.4-5). On Anaia see Thuc. III.19. 1f. and 32.2.
The same incident of the Mytilenean fugitives is briefly recorded by Diodoros, who specifies only that their number was large and that the Athenians put some of these fugitives to death, and expelled others from Antándros. 176

4. Ambrakiots and Peloponnesian Refugees.

During the Amphilochnian campaign in the winter of 426/5, where the Peloponnesians and their local allies were defeated by the Athenians and their allies there, the Ambrakiots suffered a serious defeat by the Athenians and Akarnanians, in the battle of Olpai. Most of the Peloponnesians, who had survived a previous conflict, now by virtue of a secret agreement with Demosthenes 177 withdrew safely; but their allies, the Ambrakiots and some Peloponnesians, cut off from the main body, were given chase with heavy losses; about two hundred of them were killed. 178 The rest of the Ambrakiots together with some Peloponnesians escaped across the frontier into Agrai and found shelter there with the king of the Agraiians, Salyntios, who was their friend. 179 So these people became fugitives, or more precisely, refugees. We hear of them again in Thucydides: “Next day a herald came to them from the Ambrakiots who had fled from Olpae to the country of the Agraeans. He had come to ask permission to take up the dead”. 180 After the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenians, these refugees, both Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians, who in the meantime had departed from Salyntios’ country to Oiniadai, were granted a truce by the Akarnanians and Amphilochnians allowing them to retreat from there unmolested. 181 Oberhummer convincingly suggests that the truce was for the journey from Argais to

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176. XII.72.2-3.
177. Thucydides himself, who generally does not like making direct moral characterizations, cannot refrain from calling this Peloponnesian act “selfish treachery” (III.109.2). After that, Diodoros’ information (XII.60.6, from Ephoros) that the Ambrakiots after their disaster “sent for a garrison of Lakedaimonians because they feared the Athenians” makes no sense. The Spartan reputation in this district was dead. And this was exactly Demosthenes’ crafty intention (Thuc., ibid.).
179. Thuc. I.111.4.
180. III.113.1 (Transl. Warner).
181. Thuc. III.114.2.
Oiniadai for both the Peloponnesians and the Ambrakiots, and for unhindered departure of the Ambrakiots\textsuperscript{182} home from there.\textsuperscript{183}

5. Megarian Fugitives.

In 424 the active pro-Athenian democrats of Megara took refuge in Athens when it was discovered that they were plotting with the Athenians to overthrow the government: they were merely another unsuccessful "Fifth column" in a Greek city at that time.\textsuperscript{184} "Those of the Megarians in the city who were most implicated in the plot with the Athenians, knowing that they had been discovered, immediately slipped away".\textsuperscript{185} These extreme democrats of Megara clearly became fugitives at Athens, and we do not hear of them again until the beginning of the Sicilian expedition in the summer of 415; a hundred and twenty of them went on the expedition to Sicily as light-armed troops.\textsuperscript{186} Dover points out that in Thucydides' reference to them here the word "φυγώδες" to some extent explains the term light—armed, for "exile had impoverished them".\textsuperscript{187}

To complete the discussion, we follow the story at Megara in 424: The other democrats, the moderates,\textsuperscript{188} joined in discussions with the friends of the oligarchic exiles\textsuperscript{189} and recalled them home after solemn oaths had been sworn that they would merely give the city the best council they could and there would be no recriminations for the past; this, however, resulted in an attack upon the democrats by the oligarchs, who had returned from exile, and in the establishment of an oligarchy in the city.\textsuperscript{190} As far as these oligarchic exiles from Megara are concerned, we have not been told explicitly before how and when they went into exile. We know from Thucydides that

\textsuperscript{182} Akarnanien, Ambrakia, Amphilochien, Leukas im Altertum, München, 1887, p. 112. Cf. Gomme, \textit{H.C.T.}, \textit{ad loc.}

\textsuperscript{183} Another case of troops who after a defeat took refuge in a neighbouring state is related by Thucydides in VIII.95.6.

\textsuperscript{184} Cf. Losada, \textit{Fifth Column}, pp. 18, 44, 49ff., 122f. .

\textsuperscript{185} Thuc. IV.74.2 (Transl. Warner); on "slipped away" cf. Thuc. VI.51.2.

\textsuperscript{186} Thuc. VI.43; cf. VII.57.8 .

\textsuperscript{187} H.C.T., \textit{ad loc.}

\textsuperscript{188} Gomme, \textit{(H.C.T.), on IV.74.3), wrongly, we think, takes "the others" as referring to "the extreme oligarchs, most of them from among the exiles". Cf. Classen-Steup, and Spratt, \textit{ad loc.}

\textsuperscript{189} On these exiles see Thuc. IV.66.1, and the hint at III.68.3.

\textsuperscript{190} Thuc. IV.74.2–4.
they had taken Pegai, and made it their base for operations. It has been convincingly suggested that these exiles were in all probability the same men as those who in 427 had been given the right to live in Plataia for one year.

6. Toronaiian Fugitives.

In the winter of 424/3 Brasidas during his operations in Thrace, as the Chalkidice peninsula was then called, attacked Torone. With the help of the fifth-columnists within the walls he surprised and rushed the city and, when the Athenian garrison took refuge in the fort called Lekythos, the democratic Toronaian followed them. What is more interesting here is to note that Brasidas displayed real interest in saving these fugitives, including even the men of the Athenian garrison, by making a mild proclamation to both of them, which was rejected. In this he was, indeed, rather gentler towards the Toronaian than he had been to the Akanthians before. Gomme’s explanation of this is attractive: he had won his way and could afford to be more generous, and knew how to be.

7. Argive Fugitives.

When in the winter of 416/5 the Spartans planned to invade the territory of Argos, the sacrifices for crossing the frontier turned out to be unfavourable and they gave up the expedition. But the very fact that an invasion was decided on made the democratic Argives suspect certain oligarchic people in their city, some of whom they arrested, while others succeeded in escaping.

191. IV.66.1; cf. Spratt’s note *ad loc.* For Pegai cf. I.103.4, III.2 and III.115.1.
192. Classen-Steup, *ad loc.*, followed by Gomme, *H.C.T.*, *ad loc.* Classen-Steup (ibid.) also put the capture of Pegai at 426, that is immediately after the one year they spent at Plataia. *Cf.* Spratt, *ad loc.*
193. Thuc. III.68.3.
195. See our *Captives and Hostages*, pp. 98ff.
196. Thuc. IV.114.1 and 4.
197. Thuc. IV.84f. and 88.
198. *H.C.T.*, on IV.114.4-5.
There is no further explicit reference to the fate of these fugitives but one can safely conjecture that they joined the other oligarchic exiles of Argos, who had been expelled a short time before.\textsuperscript{200} These exiles were initially at Phleious\textsuperscript{201} but were later settled by the Spartans at Orneai\textsuperscript{203} together with a few troops; then the Spartans arranged a truce for a certain time between Argos and Orneai according to which neither side was to do harm to the other's territory. But soon afterwards an Athenian force arrived and the Argives \textit{en masse} marched out with the Athenians and besieged the people in Orneai for one day; in the night the garrison escaped; when the Argives discovered this on the following day, they razed Orneai to the ground.\textsuperscript{203} In Diodoros' version it was the Athenians who took the town and "of the garrison and exiles some they put to death and others they expelled from Orneai".\textsuperscript{204} We do not hear anything more of the Argive exiles and the above fugitives who in all probability joined them.

8. \textit{Katanaian Fugitives.}

When in the summer of 415 Alkibiades with the Athenian fleet sailed for a second time to Katane, in Sicily, an assembly was held to decide whether they would receive the Athenians into the city or not; and though the people would not allow the army inside the city, they invited the generals to come and say what they wished to say.\textsuperscript{205} While Alkibiades was speaking and the citizens of Katane were all intent on the assembly, the Athenian troops managed secretly to enter the city.\textsuperscript{206} Then, "as soon as the pro-Syracusan party in Katane saw the army inside, they became terrified and slipped away (there were not very many of them)".\textsuperscript{207} So the vote of the assembly was swayed by the presence of the Athenian troops in favour of and in agreement with Athens.\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{200} Thuc. V.82.2, 83.3, 115.1. \textit{Cf.} Diod. XII.81.4–5.
\textsuperscript{201} Thuc. V.83.3.
\textsuperscript{202} An ally of Argos in 418 (Thuc. V.61.2).
\textsuperscript{203} Thuc. VI.7.1–2; \textit{cf.} Ar. \textit{Birds}, 399 "Killed at Orneai", and Dover's note, \textit{H.C.T.}, on VI.7.2.
\textsuperscript{204} XII.81.5.
\textsuperscript{205} Thuc. VI.51.1. \textit{Cf.} Diod. XIII.4.4. Polyain. I.40.4 (from Thucydides, with arbitrary changes — Busolt, \textit{Gr. Gesch.}, 1306, n. 3).
\textsuperscript{206} Thuc. \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{207} Thuc. VI.51.2.
\textsuperscript{208} Thuc. \textit{ibid.} \textit{Cf.} Diod. XIII.4.5.
These few fugitives are not explicitly referred to any more, but it is likely that they took refuge at Syracuse. But is seems that these were not the only Syracusan sympathizers from Katane, since we might infer from Thucydides' account that later there might still be certain people in Katane whose names were known to the Syracusans as being among the remnant of the pro-Syracusan party there. The fact that the Syracusans knew the names of their friends from Katane favours the suggestion that the fugitives had taken refuge with the Syracusans.


In the spring of 414 the Thespian demos made an attack upon the oligarchs who were in office at that time. This attempt to overthrow the government turned out to be unsuccessful and, when help arrived from Thebes for the government, some of the democrats were arrested while others took refuge in Athens. These people were clearly not “expelled” or “condemned to exile” by the authorities of their country, but of their own accord fled their country in order to avoid arrest. So Dover’s note “ἐκπίπτειν is used both of being forced away from where one wants to be and of being expelled in civil war” is incomplete; another meaning is that of “escape”, “flee”, “go away”, “become a fugitive”, “take refuge at...”, as is the case here. When a state drives citizens out of the country, it does not also dictate to them the place of their exile, and here we clearly read that “τῆς πέπεσαι Αθηνας τω Σπατηρίω”. There is thereafter no explicit reference to the fate of these Thespian fugitives.

209. VI.64.2–3. Losada (Fifth Column, p. 17 with n. 1) argues that there was no “fifth-column” in Katane at all and that the whole story of Thuc. VI.64.2–3 with the use of a “double agent” was a neat intelligence operation. We agree with Losada that the whole story was a trick, but we think that there must have been some “fifth columnist” remnant in Katane; otherwise the operation would have failed if the names were not real or if the Syracusans did not know them as their friends.

210. Thuc. VI.95.2.

211. H.C.T., ad loc. However, Dover’s second approach to this subject (ibid., on VII.19.3) shows some doubt: “The elements at Thespiai unfriendly to Thebes had been disposed of...” See our note in ΠΑΤΩΝ 28(1976), pp. 237f. We agree, nevertheless, with Dover’s view (on VI.95.2) that B’s ἔξεφυγον is a banalization.

212. See L.S.J., s.v.
On this occasion it is perhaps noteworthy that of the twenty-two times Thucydides uses this verb (see Table below) in thirteen cases he clearly uses it with the passive meaning \(^{213}\) of "being expelled", \(^{214}\) and in only seven of them in civil war; \(^{215}\) in three cases the meaning is rather "escape", "take refuge" after a war or civil strife, \(^{216}\) and in six instances we have the meaning of "fall out" or "fall ashore". \(^{217}\)

**Uses of ἐκπίπτω in Thucydides.**

1. I.2.6. «οἱ πολέμω ᾧ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες»
2. I.12.2. «ἄφ' ὄν (πόλεων) ἐκπίπτοντες»
3. I.127.1. «ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ»
4. II.27.2. «ἐκπέσοντος δὲ τοῖς Αἰγινήταις»
5. II.92.3. «ἐξέπέσεν ἐς τὸν λιμένα»
6. III.68.3. «κατὰ στάσιν ἐκπεπτωκόσι»
7. IV.56.2. «Αἰγινήταις ἐκπέσοντι»
8. IV.66.1. «ἐκπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους»
9. IV.66.3. «τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν»
10. IV.128.4. «εἰ τινι σκευεί ἐκπεπτωκότι»
11. V.4.4. «τῶν τοῦ δῆμου τότε ἐκπεσόντων»
12. V.5.1. «τοῖς... ἐποίκοις ἐκπεπτωκόσιν»
13. VI.4.1. «ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐκπέσων»
14. VI.4.5. «αὐτοὶ μὲν... ἐκπίπτουσι»
15. VI.95.2. «οἱ δ' ἔξεπεσον Ἀθηναῖζ»
16. VII.33.5. «στάσει... ἐκπεπτωκότας»
17. VII.50.1. «ἡ... στάσις... ἔξεπεπτώκει»
18. VII.71.6. «ἐξέπεσον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον»
19. VII.74.2. «ὡς ἡ κάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυίαν»
20. VIII.34. «ἐκπίπτουσι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν»
21. VIII.81.2. «ἀπὸ τῶν ἐλπίδων ἐκπίπτοιεν»
22. VIII.109.1. «ἔξεπεπτώκεσαν οἱ φρουροί»

\(^{213}\) ἐκπίπτω is used here as the passive (in meaning only, though active in form) of ἐκβάλλω. Cf. τοῦ ἀκοῦσα as passive of τοῦ ἔγραμ, and bene audio of bene dico. Cf. Schwyzer-Debunker, Griechische Grammatik, München, 1968, II. p. 223.

\(^{214}\) Table, cases: 3, 4; 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 22.

\(^{215}\) Table, cases: 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16 and 17.

\(^{216}\) Table, cases: 1, 2, 15.

\(^{217}\) Table, cases: 5, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21.
10. Messenian Refugees

The case of the Messenians is unique in the Peloponnesian War, in the respect that they were already refugees when the War broke out and remained refugees after it had finished. The so-called Third Messenian War, after the great earthquake of 464, resulted in the surrender of the Messenian stronghold of Ithome after a long siege. Those who survived were granted safe-conduct by the Lakedaimonians, and in 456/5 they were settled by the Athenians in Naupaktos which they had captured.\textsuperscript{218} During the entire Peloponnesian War the Messenian fugitives fought at the side of the Athenians because of their old hatred of Sparta, and played an important part in several operations, especially in the victory at Pylos in 425.\textsuperscript{219} Their last mention in Thucydides refers to their participation in the expedition to Sicily in 415.\textsuperscript{220}

At the end of the War the Messenian refugees were expelled by the Spartans from Naupaktos.\textsuperscript{221} Thereafter the Messenians ceased to exist as a state.\textsuperscript{222} In Diodoros’ version they were not driven out from Naupaktos immediately after Aigospotami but later, in 401/0. Also from Diodoros we learn that some of the Messenians were expelled from Kephallenia, too, where they had formed a stronghold. Chased by the Spartans from all over Greece they left, some to serve in Dionysios’ mercenary troops in Sicily, others, about three thousand of them, to join the exiles from Kyrene. In a decisive battle between the two Kyrenaian parties almost all these Messenians were killed.\textsuperscript{223}


In the summer of 412 the Athenians again succeeded in bringing Klazomenai under their control, after its recent revolt. When the Klazomenians revolted, they crossed at once to the mainland and began to fortify Polichna as a place of safe refuge, should it become necessary.\textsuperscript{224} But now the

\textsuperscript{218} Hdt. IX.35.2; Thuc. I.101.2 and 103.3; cf. Diod. XI.84.7. See E. Kiechle, Messenische Studien, Hallmünz-Oberpfalz, 1959.
\textsuperscript{219} Thuc. IV.3.3, 9.1, 32.2, 36.1 and 41.2.
\textsuperscript{220} VII.31.2 and 57.8. See our article in ΠΑΘΩν 27 (1975), pp. 263ff.
\textsuperscript{221} Paus. IV.26.2 and X.38.10.
\textsuperscript{222} See Dover, H.C.T., on VII.57–58 (p. 435).
\textsuperscript{223} XIV.32.2–5. Cf. Andrewes, H.C.T., on V.35.7.
\textsuperscript{224} Thuc. VIII.14.3.
Athenians sailing from Lesbos to Polichna on the mainland "captured the place and took the people back to their city on the island, except for those who had been responsible for the revolt, who withdrew to Daphnus". So these anti-Athenian Kklazomenians became fugitives and Kklazomenai once more Athenian. Shortly afterwards the Spartan admiral Astyochos came to Kklazomenai and ordered the pro-Athenian party there to move to Daphnous and join forces with the Peloponnesians and, presumably, with the fugitives too. The same orders were also issued by Tamos, the Persian king's officer in Ionia. But the Kklazomenians refused to obey, and Astyochos made an unsuccessful attack on the town, after which he sailed away. In Diodoros we read that in 407/6 Kklazomenai was attacked by "some exiles". Although there is no clear evidence as to who exactly these "exiles" were, it seems to us very probable that it must have been those Kklazomenian oligarchic fugitives who had settled in Daphnous. A *psephism* moved by Alkibiades in 407 ratifies a treaty made by the Athenian generals with the Kklazomenian settlers at Daphnous. But it is highly problematic to say how the Athenian generals came to make a treaty with the settlers at Daphnous "on the ground that they had been brave men", who were anti-Athenian, and whether the composition of the settlement had changed in the meantime. The latter seems to us possible if we only suppose that Tamos partly succeeded later in what Astyochos had failed to achieve from the Kklazomenian democrats.

12. Rhodian Fugitives.

In the winter of 412/1, at the request of some of the leading elements in Rhodes, the Peloponnesians sailed to the island on ninety four ships with the

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225. Thuc. VIII.23.6 (Transl. Warner).
226. Steup (Classen-Steup, on VIII.32.2) is, we suppose, wrong in thinking that "Die Athener hatten die Führer der oligarchischen Partei... dahin verwiesen". These people according to Thucydides' clear evidence "withdrew", "moved to Daphnous", they were not expelled by the Athenians; though, apparently, they left for fear of punishment.
228. XIII.71.1 (from Ephoros).
229. Cf. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., pp. 1431f., n. 3. M-L (p. 271, *ad init.*) are more reserved: "The exiles of 407/6 need not necessarily be the settlers at Daphnus".
233. Thuc. VIII.31.3.
intention of making Rhodes revolt from Athens and of gaining control of the strong and wealthy island. But when they arrived at Kameiros, in Rhodian territories, the mass of the inhabitants, knowing nothing about the negotiations which had previously taken place were terrified and fled away, especially as the city was unfortified. Later the Spartans invited the remnant of the Kameiriains into an assembly together with the people of two other Rhodian cities, Lindos and Ialysos, and persuaded them all to revolt from Athens and to join the Peloponnesian alliance. The Athenians arrived too late to prevent the revolt, but from their main naval base at Samos and the advanced stations in Chalke and Kos thmy carried on the war against Rhodes.

We do not hear any more of these, apparently democratic, fugitives of Kameiros. It is not even quite clear from Thucydides’ text whether they stayed in exile at all, or returned home and joined the assembly together with the other inhabitants of Kameiros and of the other two Rhodian cities.

In Diodoros we read instead that Dorieus, the exiled oligarchic leader of Rhodes, was sent by the Spartan admiral Mindaros to Rhodes with thirteen ships since it was learnt that certain Rhodians were banding together for a revolution and that he managed to quell the tumult there.


In 411, during the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred in Athens, the crew of the trireme Paralos who were demos-sympathizers and who had recently been transferred into a common troop-carrier with instructions to sail round Euboia were foolishly ordered by the new regime to carry to Sparta on board this vessel three representatives of the Four Hundred; but when they reached Argos on their voyage, the “Paraloi” arrested these ambassadors and

235. Thuc. VIII.44.2.
236. Thuc. VIII.44.3; cf. VIII.55.1.
237. Steup (Classen-Steup, on VIII.44.2) seems to be certain that the latter did not happen: “die gesamte Bevölkerung, sowiet die von Kameiros mich entflohen war”.
238. XIII.38.5.
239. XIII.45.1.
240. Thuc. VIII.74.2, where we also read that two or three of the “Paraloi” were arrested by the Four Hundred immediately after their arrival from Samos, where “Free Athens” (Thuc. VIII.76) was based. On troop-carriers see Busolt, Gr. Staatsk., p. 1198 and n. 2.
handed them over to the Argives as prisoners for having been active in the oligarchical conspiracy and in the overthrow of the democracy in Athens. After that the "Paraloí" did not return back to Athens but escaped on the same trireme to Samos carrying thither some Argive envoys with an offer of aid to the Athenian demos in exile. What the fate of the captive oligarchical ambassadors was we do not know, though one may presume that it could not have been very happy.

As for the fugitive crew of "Paraloí", they constitute a peculiar group of political refugees from one party of a state to another, so to say, in exile: they are neither purely fugitives nor refugees nor (except in the opinion of the Four Hundred) deserters, but a mixture of all three. It is certain that after joining the democratic navy based at Samos they continued the war from there.


When later in the same year 411 the Four Hundred were overthrown, Peisandros and Alexikles and the most extreme members of the Oligarchy left Athens and fled to Dekeleia, where their supporters, the Spartans, were. The only exceptions among the ringleaders were Antiphon, who remained to be brought to trial and condemned to death by the demos, and the general Aristarchos who, before becoming a fugitive at Oinoe, "made his flight the means of inflicting a new wound upon his country." So the fall of the Oligarchy meant the end of separation between the city and the armament at Samos.

As for these fugitives, judging from Thucydides’ wording and from the numerous trials which followed the fall of oligarchy, they do not seem to

241. Thuc. VIII.86.9.
242. It reminds us, mutatis mutandis, of Thuc. VI.61.3. Cf. our Captives and Hostages, pp. 210ff. Ferguson, C.A.H., V, p. 336, thinks possible that these ambassadors reached their destination of Sparta later.
243. Thuc. VIII.98.1.
244. Thuc. VIII.68.2.
have been many, despite Lysias' express information to the contrary. After their escape they were in absentia accused of treason and outlawed as deserters to the enemy's camp, and their properties were confiscated. That these fugitives had been excluded from the amnesty of Patrokleides after the overthrow of the Oligarchy we learn from Andokides the orator. Most of them returned home about six years later after Aigospotamoi when the Athenian democracy was again overthrown, and the Thirty Tyrants, with the aid of Lysandros, came into power. Many of them became members of the Boule which functioned under the Thirty.

15. Athenian Generals Fugitives.

Two of the eight Athenian generals, Protomachos and Aristogenes, who survived the defeat at sea off Arginusai in 406, did not return to Athens after the fight but became fugitives. In Diodoros (from Ephoros) we read that they fled into exile "fearing the wrath of the populace". Indeed, the six other generals who loyally went back home were all brought to trial and sentenced to death. We do not hear of the two fugitives any more.

247. XII (Against Agoratos), 73 "οἱ πολλοί τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐφυγον". Cf. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., p. 1510, n. 3. According to Lykourgos (ibid.) Alexikles also was brought to trial and put to death together with Aristarchos; this does not agree with Thucydides' information that they were both fugitives, the former in Dekeleia the latter in Oinoe, which was now under Boiotian control (VIII.98.1-4); unless, of course, they both fell later, in some way unknown to us, into the hands of the Athenian demos. Aristarchos, according to Xenophon (Hell. I.7.28), was brought to trial in Athens (not explicitly together with Alexikles) and condemned to death.

248. Lyk., ibid., 120.

249. Lyk., ibid., 120; for the confiscation of Peisandros' goods see Lys. VII (Areopagitikos).


251. Lys. XIII.74: "οἱ αυτοὶ ἔσαν ἄπαντες τῶν τετρακοσίων τῶν φυγόντων", where, of course, one must take 'ἀπαντες' as a rhetorical exaggeration.


253. VIII.101.5.

254. Diodoros (from Ephoros) raised any noble motive from their decision: "they sailed home to Athens... hoping that they would have their crews, which were numerous, to help them in the trial". (XIII.101.5).

But not long afterwards the Athenians were seized by repentance\textsuperscript{256} and passed a decree in the Assembly authorizing the public prosecution of those who had deceived the people. There were five of them including Kallixenos. Sureties were appointed who for security reasons imprisoned them until the trial was over. All of them, however, taking advantage of a political turmoil, managed to escape before their trial. Of these fugitives, Kallixenos eventually returned home by virtue of the amnesty of 403 after the restoration of democracy but only to die of hunger as an object of universal detestation.\textsuperscript{257} Diodoros’ (from Ephoros) version is more dramatic though, as usual, less true: “The deceiver... Callixenus... was brought to trial on the charge of having deceived the people, and without being allowed to speak in his own defence he was put in chains and thrown into the public prison; and secretly burrowing his way out of the prison with certain others he managed to make his way to the enemy at Deceleia, to the end that by escaping death he might have the finger of scorn pointed at his turpitude not only in Athens but also wherever else there were Greeks throughout his entire life”\textsuperscript{258}.

16. Fugitives of Byzantion.

When in 405 after Aigospotamoi Lysandros recaptured Byzantion, those “Fifth columnists” who had betrayed the city to Alkibiades about three years before\textsuperscript{259} fled first to Pontos and subsequently to Athens where they became Athenian citizens.\textsuperscript{260} Xenophon gives the names of the chief “traitors”: Kydon, Ariston, Anaxikrates, Lykourgos and Anaxilaos. The last named later fell into the hands of the Spartans (there are no details as to how this occurred) and was impeached for treachery on the capital charge in Sparta but was acquitted after a fine plea: first, he was not a Lakedaimonian but a Byzantine; second, not only had he not betrayed his country but he had saved it when he saw women and children starving because of the siege, as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{256} For the repentance of the democratic mass see Arist. \textit{Athen. Const.}, 28.3 and Plat. \textit{Apol.}, 32 b.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Xen. \textit{Hell.}, I.7.35. Cf. Aristeid. \textit{Panath.}, III.245 and the \textit{Suda}, s.v.
\item \textsuperscript{258} XIII.103.2 (Transl. Oldfather); see Busolt’s criticism, \textit{Gr. Gesch.}, p. 1608, n. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Xen. \textit{Hell.}, II.2.1; on a stratagem there see Diod. XIII.67.1–5, Frontinus III.11.3, Polyain. I.48.2.
\end{itemize}
Klearchos,\textsuperscript{261} the Spartan commander there, had given all the food in the city to the Lakedaimonian troops. For these reasons, Anaxilaos himself admitted, he had introduced the enemy into the city, and not for the sake of money nor out of hatred for Sparta.\textsuperscript{262} These fugitives had presumably first fled to Pontos and not directly to Athens because the future of the City was very gloomy, but they took refuge there later after the restoration of the democracy in 403. That Athens granted citizenship to such persons we know also from the case of Apollodoros from Selymbria.\textsuperscript{263}

17. Athenian Democratic Refugees.

At the end of the Peloponnesian War during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in 404, in addition to those democrats who were officially banished,\textsuperscript{264} there is evidence of political refugees, too. From Xenophon we learn that after Theramenes was put to death, the Thirty, feeling free to play the tyrant without any fear or obstacle, issued an order — forbidding all those who were not their self-declared supporters, to set foot within the City. This was essentially an indirect pressure upon all democratic citizens to go into exile, for "retirement into the country districts was no protection, thither the prosecutor followed them, and thence dragged them, and their farms and properties might fall to the possession of the Thirty and their friends. Even the Piraeus was not safe; of those who sought refuge there, many were driven forth in similar fashion, until Megara and Thebes overflowed with the crowd of refugees".\textsuperscript{265} It was after this event that the Spartans issued the appalling order to all states under their rule that they should not receive political refugees from Athens and should extradite to the Thirty those who had already taken refuge with them. But the Argives, Megarians and Thebans were brave enough not to obey.\textsuperscript{266} Thrasyboulos, the democratic leader, in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{261} Of him Diodoros (XIII.66.6 from Ephoros), says that he was a harsh man, and for this reason, hating the severity of his administration, some Byzantines had delivered up the city to the Athenians.
\item \textsuperscript{263} \textit{I.G.}, I\textsuperscript{2} 116, Tod. 88, M–L 87.
\item \textsuperscript{264} Xen. \textit{Hell.} II.3.42, II.4.17; Isokr. XVI.15.16; Plut. \textit{Lys.} 27.5; Diod. XIV.6; Just. (\textit{Epit.}), V.8.
\item \textsuperscript{265} \textit{Hell.}, II.4.1 (Transl. Dakyns).
\item \textsuperscript{266} Plut. \textit{Pelop.}, 6.5; \textit{Lys.}, 27.5f., Diod. XIV.6.3, Lys. XII, 95, 97. Xenophon has been strongly criticized for omitting this information. \textit{Cf.} Henry, \textit{Hellenica}, p. 4. According to Diodoros (\textit{ibid.}) and Isokrates VII (\textit{Areop.}), 67, thousands of Athenians were in exile at that time. On the Reign of terror under the Thirty see Lys. \textit{ibid.}, and XXV.22.
\end{itemize}
his exhortation before the decisive battle of Mounychia reminded his troops of how the Thirty “have not spared to rob them of their city, though they did no wrong; they have hounded them from their homes; at any moment while they supped or slept or marketed, sentence of banishment was passed upon them; they have done no wrong—nay, many of them were not even resident in the country”.267

But when the demos won, it was the turn of the Thirty to become fugitives. Even during their domination they had already wanted “to appropriate Eleusis, so that an asylum might be ready for them against the day of need”.268 Now that the day of need came, the remnant of the Thirty fled to Eleusis.269

When soon afterwards Thrasyboulos occupied Athens and democracy was restored, an amnesty was granted excluding the Thirty and their close collaborators.270

Any citizen who did not feel quite safe in the City was allowed to take refuge at Eleusis, too.271 In the winter of 401/0272 the demos, on receiving information that the party at Eleusis were collecting mercenaries, marched out en masse against them and put to death the oligarchic generals who came out to parley. There the Athenians introduced to the other oligarchs their friends and connections, and so persuaded them to come to terms and be reconciled.273

CONCLUSIONS

Most of the individuals or groups of fugitives and refugees fled into exile either as a result of the War itself or because of local political implications, caused by the War. Some of the individual fugitives and refugees were important personalities in their countries and a few of them, such as Alkibiades, Demosthenes, Glymphos and Konon, were among the protagonists of the War. Some were later able to return home, to restore their

271. Xen. ibid. Cf. Arist. (ibid.), and Diod. (ibid.).
273. Xen. Hell. II.4.43.
reputation and prestige, and to offer great services to their state. Alkibiades’ case is unique not only because he became a fugitive twice but also because on both occasions his decision exerted great influence upon the conduct of war. In some cases Thucydides’ narration of the events is obscure; he refers vaguely to “φυγάδες” without giving details.

Only two of the seven individuals became fugitives independently of the War and of home affairs. Two of them returned home before the end of the War, one returned after it, one died in exile and for the remaining three there is no explicit evidence but in all probability they died in exile.

All the groups of refugees and fugitives were either troops or active elements in local civil strifes, caused by the general conflict; some of them played the role of the “Fifth-column” at home.

Of the seventeen instances of groups of fugitives or refugees three are military groups (one of Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians, and two of Athenians), and fourteen are groups of citizens–activists in civil strife (seven of democrats, five of oligarchs, one pro–Syracusan and one anti–Spartan). In only four out of seventeen cases it is explicitly mentioned that most of the members returned home; in nine there is no clear reference to their returning home; in one most probably they came back home; in two cases of groups the fugitives were taken captive and slaughtered by their political enemies, and in one case most of the members of a group died in exile.

274. Those of Thuc. IV.133.2–3 and Diod. XIII.6.7., cases No 6 and No. 7.
275. Demosthenes and Alkibiades (from the first self-exile).
276. Konon; see above, Individuals, case No 4.
277. Gylippus; see above case, No 2; also Alkibiades as a fugitive for the second time; above, case No 3(b).
278. Ptoiodoros, Chrysis, and Diagoras the “atheist”; above cases 5,6,7.
279. See above, Groups of Fugitives and Refugees, case No 4.
280. See above, cases No 13 and No 15.
281. See above, cases 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 17.
282. See above, cases 1, 5, 6, 9, 12, 16 and 17.
283. See above, cases 2, 3, 7, 11 and 14.
284. See above, case 8.
285. See above, case 10.
286. See above, cases 1, 4, 14 and 17.
287. See above, cases 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15 and 16.
288. See above, case 13.
289. See above, cases 2 and 6.
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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Τα βασικά συμπεράσματα, στα οποία κατέληξε ή έρευνα αυτή για το πρόβλημα των φυγάδων και προσφύγων στόν Πελοποννησιακό Πόλεμο, είναι τα εξής:

1. Οι περισσότεροι άπο τούς φυγάδες και πρόσφυγες, άτομα ή ομάδες, αναγκάστηκαν να έκκατερισθούν είτε εξαιτίας του ίδιου του Πολέμου είτε εξαιτίας τοπικών πολιτικών επιπλοκών, που και αυτές προκλήθηκαν άπο τον Πόλεμο.

2. Μερικά άτομα των κατηγοριών αυτών ήταν σπουδαίες προσωπικότητες της χώρας τους, λίγοι μάλιστα άπο αυτούς υπήρξαν ξάναμεσα στούς πρωταγωνίστες τού Πολέμου, διότι ο 'Αλκιβίαδης (δύο φορές αυτοεξόριστος), ο Δημοσθένης, ο Γύλιππος και ο Κόνων. Μερικοί μπόρεσαν άργοτερα νά έπιστρέψουν άπο την εξορία, νά άποκαταστήσουν τό κύρος και τό γόπηρο τους και νά προσφέρουν μεγάλες υπηρεσίες στην πατρίδα τους.

3. Η περίπτωση ιδιαίτερα τού 'Αλκιβίαδη είναι μοναδική, δεί χι μόνο γιατί στερήθηκε επανειλημμένα την πατρίδα του, αλλά και γιατί στην πρώτη περίπτωση κατέφυγε στούς εχθρούς, τους όποιους και ύψελησε ως σύμβουλος στέκοτα, και γιατί στις δύο περιπτώσεις ή άποφασή του νά αυτοεξορισθεί επηρεάσε σε μεγάλο βαθμό τήν πορεία του Πολέμου.

4. Σε μερικές περιπτώσεις οι πληροφορίες του Θουκυδίδη ή άλλων πηγών είναι όσαφες. Αναφέρουν άροιτά "φυγάδες", χωρίς νά δίνουν λεπτομέρειες. Είναι ιδιαίτερα προσπάθεια να διαλέγει κανθάρους οι περιπτώσεις αυτές.

5. Μόνο δύο άπο τούς επτά μεμονωμένους φυγάδες (εξιάντρες, μία γυναίκα) έχασαν τήν πατρίδα τους άνεξάρτητα άπο τον Πόλεμο και άπο τοπικές εμφύλιες διαμάχες. Δύο έπαναπατριστήκαν πριν άπο τέλος τού Πολέμου, ένας μετά, ένας πέθανε στήν εξορία, ένας για τούς υπόλοιπους τρεις δέν υπάρχουν ρητές μαρτυρίες, άλλα πιθανότατα πέθαναν στήν εξορία.

6. Ολες οι ομάδες φυγάδων και προσφύγων άποτελούσαν είτε στρατιωτικά τμήματα είτε ένεργά μέλη σε εμφύλιες έρειδες που προκλήθηκαν άπο τή γενική σύρραξη. Μερικοί άπο αυτούς έπαιζαν το ρόλο τής "πέμπτης φάλαγγας" στήν πατρίδα τους.

7. Από τις δεκαεπτά περιπτώσεις ομάδων από φυγάδες και πρόσφυγες οι τρεις άποτελούν στρατιωτικά τμήματα (μία από 'Αμπρακιώτες και Πελοποννησίους και δύο από 'Αθηναίους) και οι δεκατέσσερες άποτελούν ομάδες άπο ένεργά μέλη σε εμφύλιες συγκρούσεις (έπτα
δημοκρατικῶν, πέντε ὀλιγαρχικῶν, μία ύπερ τῶν Συρακουσῶν καί
κατὰ τῆς Σπάρτης).
8. Γιά τα μέλη μόνο τεσσάρων ἀπὸ τις ὁμάδες φυγάδων καὶ προσφύ-
γων ἀναφέρεται ρητὰ ὅτι ἐπαναπατρίσθηκαν ἀργότερα, εἶτε πριν ἀπὸ τὸ τέλος τοῦ Πολέμου εἰτε μετά. Γιά τα μέλη ἐννέα ὁμάδων δὲν ὑπάρχουν ρητὲς πληροφορίες γιὰ ἐπαναπατρισμὸ, σὲ μία περίπτω-
ση πιθανότατα ἐπαναπατρίσθηκαν, σὲ δύο τα μέλη τῶν ὁμάδων συνελήφθηκαν καὶ ἐκτελέσθηκαν ἀπὸ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀντιπάλους
tους, καὶ τέλος σὲ μία περίπτωσι τὰ περισσότερα ἀπὸ τα μέλη τῆς ὁμάδας πέθαναν στὴν ἐξορία.
Γενικά: ἡ μοιρὰ τῶν φυγάδων καὶ προσφύγων στὸν Πελοποννησιακὸ
Πόλεμο ἔξαρτήθηκε κυρίως ἀπὸ τα τελικὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν ταρα-
χῶν (συνῆθως ἐμφυλίων πολέμων), ἐξαιτίας τῶν ὁποίων ἐκπατρί-
σθηκαν.

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